BALANCING OF BADIOU'S 'TWO':

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF 'ONE'

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on the concept of Two, which has a considerable place in the Badiouean philosophy. It aims to show that, in the case of One is not, Two is in an unbalanced situation and thus, Badiou has fallen into one-sidedness. It intends to prove that Two can come into balance only when One "is" (ontology with One) and this indicates a reverse ontology, the content of which is yet unknown. Furthermore, it aims to show that the position of One forms a new beginning, one that is different from the Badiouean beginning, which is founded in the void. All the arguments in the article and the discourse on difference are aimed to be reasoned by a new representation, which allows for several ways of thinking and is shown by #.

Anahtar Sözcükler: *Badiou, Two, One, Representation*

(Badiou'daki İki'yi Dengeye Oturtmak ya da Bir'in Hesaba Katılışı)

ÖZET

Bu makalede, Badiou'nun felsefesinde önemli bir yer işgal eden İki kavramı üzerine odaklanılmıştır. Makale boyunca, İki'nin Bir'in olmadığı bir durumda dengesiz bir konumda olduğu ve böylece Badiou'nun tek yanlılığa düştüğü gösterilmek istenmiştir. İki'nin ancak Bir olduğunda (Bir'li bir ontolojide) dengeye gelebileceği ve bunun ise, henüz içeriği tam olarak bilinmeyen ters bir ontolojiyi işaret ettiği ispatlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca, Bir'in konumunun, boşlukla temellenen Badioucu bir başlangıç noktasının varlığının yanı sıra, yeni ve ondan farklı başka bir başlangıç noktası daha oluşturduğu gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Makalede geçen bütün iddialar ve farka ilişkin ontolojik anlatım, birçok düşünme olanağını kendinde barındıran ve # ile gösterilen yeni bir gösterim ile temellendirilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Keywords: *Badiou, İki, Bir, Temsil.*

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Why is it important to say that something which unbalanced should actually be in balance? If whatever it is we are talking about is already in balance by its nature and if our perception of it is faulty, this may mislead us. This is, however, an undesired situation for us and thus, crucial. This is anyway not important for the balanced. If the thing under discussion is particularly Two, this being "not" important should be further stressed. Because in this situation, even the fault or the mistake that brings the unbalanced into discussion is within the balanced encompassiveness of Two. However, before the discussion proceeds any further, in order for what I have said and what I will say to be better understood and to elaborate on the topic, I feel inclined to resort to Badiou's concept of Two.

Why Badiou? Because Badiou is the first person to systematically inform us of Two. Two was previously dealt with, but in faint terms. As a matter of fact, Badiou is like an apple worm that ate half of the apple and left the other half in yet a very initial stage wherein he encountered a One-less situation, which he constructed in his philosophy and, in a way, posited as true. He, in his axiomatic system of philosophy, has been in one-sidedness. It is right at this point that I aim to show the other half of the apple and thus, place Two in balance.

I intend to do the following throughout the paper, thereof:

1. to show that the beginning of Badiou is not an absolute beginning and that when one goes backward leaving from this beginning, another beginning exists pointing to a situation with One.
2. thus to review Two once again,
3. to show that a consideration of beginning situations that are with and without One together hints at a more abstract structure with a certain representation,
4. to indicate that this representation is basically # # # and subject to various transformations.

The Problem Of Beginning

Since Euclid, we have known that we cannot go backward infinitely along a chain of reasoning and that a reasoning should be done by a beginning which is comprised of axiom and definitions and through inference of the following propositions from the previous ones. Euclid's monumental book *Elements* set an example to this. For the time being, I will call this logic, which claims that conclusion is inferred from the premises or the proposed conclusions already exist in the premises, thus the real truth is present implicitly in the premises, as the Euclidean logic. I am not here to explain in detail the Euclidean logic. However, I guess it is not difficult to trace the Euclidean logic in philosophy. I assume that nearly all will admit that, apart form a few examples, almost the whole Western philosophy and the intellectual life is shaped by the Euclidean logic. The Euclidean logic of reasoning, which adopts a *monist* approach as a start, has much been utilized in philosophy since Plato, but the latest example has been used by the contemporary philosopher Alain Badiou in a most striking way and drew much attention.

Then, what is the place of Euclidean beginning in Badiou's philosophical systematic? Put more clearly, in Badiou's philosophy, what exactly is the place to which many other terms owe their meanings? It is important to locate this place because later, the beginning will constitute the content of the Badiouean One and Two. If there is something missing in the understanding of One and Two, which is actually what we claim, we will have to scrutinize into this beginning.

Some of Badiou's Concepts and His Ontology

And thus, I believe it is necessary to look at Badiou's understanding of ontology for our purpose. We can derive enough of clues on his ontology from *Being and Event*.

Let us start. A sentence from *Being and Event*: "Ontology can be solely the theory of inconsistent multiplicities as such" (Badiou 2005:28). At first sight, the sentence appears to reflect a fundamental argument that relates to ontology. What might be the meaning of this argument? The sentence requires a comprehension of the concept of "inconsistent multiplicities". First of all, the concept of "inconsistent multiplicities" is a crucial concept explaining ontology without One. And with Badiou, One-lessness of ontology in fact reveals a lot. For example, it reveals the beginning of the counting operation, where lies the "inconsistent multiplicities", which are difficult to express. "Inconsistent multiplicities" differentiate from the "consistent multiplicities" by the counting operation. Before/prior to the counting operation is placed "inconsistent multiplicity", which has been the subject of counting, and consistent multiplicity is on the result side of the counting. The counting mentioned is however count-as-one. What is, then, count-as-one and why does the "inconsistent multiplicity" exist in the beginning? Certainly we are as yet standing on a very early stage of the explanation concerning the One-lessness and the consequently emerging ontology. But, let us select another sentence from *Being and Event* again to find the answer for now: "Ontology, if it exists, it is *a* situation" (Badiou 2005:25). What does it mean if ontology is a situation? Badiou uses the word situation synonymously with "any presented multiplicity" (Badiou 2005: 24). Here ontology is a presentation, but especially one explaining the after-the-counting. Because, according to

Badiou, every structure is composed of a count-as-one operator of a situation of its own (Badiou 2005:24), and structuration –in other words count-as-one- is an effect (Badiou 2005:25), or a result. Multiple, on the other hand, is twofold: 1) the multiple which comprehends the being-one as a result and retroactively what comes before it as non-one; 2) multiple as 'several-ones' counted by the action of the structure … The former is called the *inconsistent multiplicity,* whereas the latter is called the *consistent multiplicity* (Badiou 2005:25) Therefore, ontology is a form of presentation wherein being-one is derived as the result by count-as-one from non-one. Then, what is non-one which is the subject of this count-as-one, which makes "exist"?

Non-one which has been the subject of count-as-one operation, or "inconsistent multiplicity", is related with the concept of *void*: "Every inconsistency is in the final analysis unpresentable, thus void" (Badiou as cited in Hallward 2003:91). Although *inconsistency* is associated with the *unpresentable* through the concept of *void*, these are different from each other. Both inconsistency and void indicate the same thing: *Nothing*. Void is made of *nothing* and inconsistency is *nothing*. However, the reason why *nothing* is called inconsistent is that *nothing* reflects "an illegal inconsistency of the being". Put differently, what is inconsistent is the nothing which is not overviewed, not differentiated, i.e., not counted and which is everywhere. Nevertheless, though it is another name of the *nothing,* void indicates no-one, One-lessness, more than it does what is everywhere and global (Badiou 2005:56) As to unpresentable, that is also some sort of limit concept, and *nothing* which has been the subject of counting is founded leaving from that. The foundational connection between *nothing* and unpresentable is given by a sentence which eloquently explains the beginning: "The unpresentable is that to which nothing, no multiple, belongs" (Badiou 2005:67). Therefore, when *nothing*, which gains existence when enunciated, is looked at from a different viewpoint, it is located "before" counting "because everything is counted" (Badiou 2005:54): It is in the sense *nothing* that initiates counting…

In this case then the possibility of ontology as a situation takes as base the earlier of yet undone counting and differentiation of everything, which is actually the nothing, and this continually goes ultimately reaching the unpresentable. That is, the point from which everything starts. And at this point, ontology is in fact an expression of the impossibility.

Let us now turn to count-as-one, which actually stands right at this point: "the *nothing* is the operation of the count" (Badiou 2005:55). What does it mean? It means, also in the light of the abovementioned arguments, that count, before anything else, starts with *nothing*. Secondly, nothing that starts the count is at the same time the counting agent. Is this one and the same thing's counting itself? Maybe… On the one hand lies the nothing, which is present in the 'before', and on the other hand enunciation of it, i.e. the being of nothing. This enunciation is the enunciation of the being of nothing, which is distinct from *nothing*. And because the content in the enunciation of the being of nothing is nothing, content and enunciation emerge side by side concomitantly after that distinctness. It is the realization of this operation that renders the realization of count-as-one. Nothing counts nothing but with a difference.

The section in which *void* is founded in *Being and Event* sheds light into the subject through the terms of set theory. Let us get back to this statement: "The unpresentable is that to which nothing, no multiple, belongs". Or nothing belongs to unpresentable. Primarily, there is a negation here. What is more, "does not belong" is stated, negation negates the "belonging". Nothing belongs to ...., and with this sentence, we acknowledge the being of nothing, which does not belong, and affirm it. This is the affirmation of "not". In brief, it is affirmative negation. Affirmation is the act of affirming that nothing *"does not belong",* by doing which it also enunciates the being of nothing. When the statement 'it does not belong to the unpresentable' is said, it is also said the being of nothing does exist. Indeed, it is stated that *nothing*, which does not belong, exists. This actually is one of the axioms of the set theory, and by this way Ø (void) has been founded: *There exists a set which has no element*. (Badiou 2005:67)

Let us dwell on this a bit more and focus on the operation of count-as-one. The set of subsets of Ø is {Ø}. In other words, it is what derives after the presentation of the unpresentable we have mentioned above. This derivation is based on two principles: 1) void is because it is the subset of any set and because it is universally included, 2) void has a subset, actually itself, which is empty. To understand why these principles are so and to understand how {Ø} and the subsequent derivations are, let us once again turn our attention to the affirmative negation mentioned above: Together with "nothing belongs to …" had emerged Ø. Its enunciation of being is realized by ∈ or {…} in the theorem of set. Nothing, void as non-one, exists. In the set theory, it is indicated implicitly that is with "belongs to", "an element of". Therefore, we have said there is at least one set, which does not have any element in it, or its element is the non-one void. In addition to this, the void in {Ø} solely constitutes the content of the enunciation. At every enunciation of void's being, –even if the previous enunciations of void are taken into account as subsets-, the content of the enunciation will always be the void. The reason is what is under discussion is always an enunciation of a lack. This actually explains well why the empty set is contained universally. It is at this point that count-as-one emerges. It is a *so-called* enunciation of void's being, enunciation of "being-nothing" (Clemens 2005:104). It is in the sense that what is nothing, what is zero, exists itself and is counted-as-one …

We have thus so far elaborated on a few fundamental concepts of Badiou we will be using throughout the text. In addition, we have said a few remarks on the beginning. Now before we proceed with Two, we will focus further on whether this beginning lacks something or not.

A Final Look at the Beginning and Two

Notice that such a beginning proposition as "nothing belongs to unpresentable" was stated through a negation, and this negation was an affirmative negation. In other words, negation ended positively. And the intention of the proposition was to express the unpresentable. The proposition above was one of the most significant propositions that could ever be made about the unpresentable. But, could it be possible that another basic proposition like this one concerning the unpresentable be constructed? Yes. Can't we say this? "Nothing does not belong to unpresentable". This does not mean that "everything belongs to unpresentable" when it is taken abstractly. It is rather to say that nothing belongs does not *happen*, so it is negated. In other words, it can be said that nothing belongs to unpresentable; in addition, for the unpresentable, its *not belonging* is not accepted, or is denied. While the first is about that *nothing* belongs, the latter is about that its *not belonging* is not *so*. While the first sentence contains an *affirmative negation,* the second one contains a *negative negation*. The negation in the first sentence is acknowledged as result; that is it is affirmed, whereas negation is not accepted in the second one and the result gets negative. In addition, while the first sentence is Badiou's Euclidean beginning sentence that relates to the unpresentable, the second one is another, a new, proposition that can be offered about unpresentable.

Then, we have two propositions:

(1) Nothing belongs to unpresentable.

(2) Nothing does not belong to unpresentable.

Both propositions are legitimately present in the beginning. The being of negativity, difference, is enunciated in the first proposition. Nevertheless, in the second one, this negativity is negated, and made persistent thereof, "closing" the gap. However, this is not an absolute "closure" because negation of the negative negation caused a new difference backward. While the differences that are derived forward with the first proposition indicate a situation without One, "the closures" of the differences backward indicate One. While the first proposition founds the void, the difference, the second one founds just the opposite. The first proposition makes enunciations geared forward at all times; in contrast, the second proposition does this backward. We will later elaborate on this topic and analyze how the derivations can take place in opposite directions. However, for the time being we will look at the consequences of the first proposition.

The following derivation is produced when the axioms of the set theory are applied starting from the first proposition:

Ø	0
{Ø}	1
{Ø, {Ø}}	2
{Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}}	3
{Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}, {Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}}}	4
….	…

Figure 1

The number on the right is what the derivation means in terms of *natural number*. We can also take Figure 1 as another representation of the *Pascal's Triangle*. To *better* comprehend this, as well how others apart from the *Void* Ø and the first *singleton* {Ø} emerge (Badiou 2005:91), we will reduce the representation above to the level of 0, 1's. First of all, let us present Ø by 0, and {Ø}, which is its enunciation of being and the concomitant content, by 0 1. Hence, as the initial derivation is denoted by void, it will be

Ø 0
{Ø} or 0 1

Following from this, the second derivation will be

Ø or 0
{Ø} 0 1
{Ø, {Ø}} 0 1 0 1

The third one will be as follows:

Ø	0
{Ø}	0 1
{Ø, {Ø}}	0 1 0 1
{Ø, {Ø}, {Ø, {Ø}}}	0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Figure 2 (a)	Figure 2 (b)

And the list can go on and on with the substitutions as to Ø and {Ø} *ad infinitum*. Figure 2 (a) and (b), in fact, are identical representations. Count-as-one operation takes place on every line of the representations, except for the first 0. On every line is a new state, which in other words, the 1 of 0 1, "the one of the one-effect itself" (Badiou 2005:95). This *new state* of the structure is called the *presentation* in the first appearance and *representation* in the following appearances. Just as there is a new state on each line, there is a repetition of those on the previous lines. For example, only one 1 among the 01 01 01 01's in Figure 2 (b) constructs a *new stat*e, and the 1's of the remaining 01 01 01's are the *representations* of the previous (01, 01 01) and parts of this structure. Hence, it is a re-count. This being the case, how does the list develop, or how does each *new state* emerge if representation is the post counting and repetition of presentation?

As mentioned in the explanation of the operation of count-as-one, the enunciation of the being of nothing, or the "does" in "nothing does belong to unpresentable" seemed to count nothing and assign to it *one* as it is the affirmation of the negation. Regardless of the difference between 'does' and 'is', "is" was "is-one" (Badiou 2005: 95). Therefore, a difference is born between nothing and the affirmed enunciation of the being of nothing. This posits that the nothing in the beginning is in fact a difference, which is rendered possible by the "does not belong" … Just as we counted the being of the first difference, now we can count the difference between this counting and the nothing in the beginning, by doing which we once again have enunciated the being of the new difference. This however means again the affirmation of a negation and the counting of it as "one" by the enunciation of "is". Therefore, another *new state* emerges. This is shown as 0 1 in the table. Why 0? Because as mentioned earlier, this difference is the content of the enunciation of being that actualizes at the same time as one. The next new state is again constructed on the difference of the previous new state from the initial nothing. This is the new enunciation of its being and enters the table as 0 1 on a new line. And this goes on like this…

Pay attention to that the basic difference here at the beginning propagates itself as difference again. That is, the original 0 propagates as 0 again, yet a *one*-like emergence takes place too as each propagation is in fact an affirmation operation relating to the zero at the beginning. This is the affirmation of a "not", or "negation". Similarly, counting is actually the counting of affirmative negation.

To recap,

1) The proposition "nothing belongs to unpresentable" functions as a beginning for the *Void* Ø to come into being and presents the unpresentableness of the unpresentable.
2) The first *singleton* {Ø} is the enunciation of the being of void and its content. It is shown by 0 1.
3) Any derivation or new state from now on hinges on the difference of each former enunciation of being from the initial void or from nothing. The new count is sort of the new enunciation of being of this difference, or its count-as-one.
4) Moreover, every enunciation of being as *presentation* is repeated via the following count-as-one; that is, it is *represented*.
5) The derivation of every new state is indeed the affirmation of the negation at the beginning. Therefore, the whole ontology is the counting of affirmative negation.

6) The difference is repeated twice, one prior to and one in the enunciation of being, and remains forever in the potential of other enunciations of being.

As noticed at first sight, the statement that explains the emergence of Two in this summary is concerned with item 6. If we want to indicate this repetition, we need to put the symbols # #, symbol # for every repetition and one gap in between them… This issue will be dealt with later, but it should be noted at this point that this is something that can be observed in the structure of the first *singleton*. In addition, since the reappearance of the presentation is always in the representation, Badiou, in his set theory, showed Two in the meta-structure of the first *singleton*: if as {Ø, {Ø}} Two, it is a transitive set, the elements of which are at the same time its parts and depicts exactly the structure of the first singleton. Owing to this, while the representation of Two in set theory is {Ø, {Ø}}, it will be enough for us to use only the *first singleton* in the representation of (0 1) reduced for {Ø, {Ø}. At this point, in the light of the derivation above and as can be clearly seen in Figure 2(b), we obtain[1] the 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 …. counting as a consequence of the first proposition at the beginning "nothing belongs to the unpresentable", though here each 0 1 pair explains bifidity of Two. Thus and so, we have summarized up until the point this proposition brings us to. Then, what result will we obtain if we trace the second proposition, which was in the beginning "nothing does not belong to unpresentable"?

Counting Backward and Two

At this point, it makes greater sense to understand what it means that the negation in the proposition "nothing does not belong to unpresentable" is negative, but not affirmative? Yet, it is essential to scrutinize first the negation in the affirmative negation. Badiou calls the logic of being qua being the classical logic (Badiou 2008:1879-1880). The reason for this is that, in classical logic, both the principle of non-contradiction and the excluded middle are obeyed and, accordingly the negation corresponding to this situation is called *strong negation*. In this logic, exclusion truly exists among alternatives. Again, between the alternatives, there is an exact gap, or separation, which can best be understood through the negation concept (Badiou 2007a:4). In addition to this, two negations are mentioned: the affirmative, the side that affirms the negation separately from the negativity of the negation and yields its identity; the negative, the destructive side that constitutes the negative power, or the negativity, of the negation (Badiou 2007b: 1). The first of these negations reveal the following: Affirmation of the negation is indeed a

[1] Furthermore, see (Dursun 2011).

process of subtraction. Nonetheless, subtraction is not an ex-traction (Badiou 2009:103), but it is at the same time the *emergence* of *new* out of the basic difference that finds expression in the logic of "nothing belongs to unpresentable". A *new* state emerges from the act of subtracting. Subtraction, "is treated from the beginning as a gap," invents "new means of formalization at precisely that point where recognizable difference is minimal, where there is 'almost nothing,' at the edge of whatever is void for that situation" (Hallward 2003: 163).

If *new* arises from the base of the void, the point where the difference is minimal, how should it be expressed in relation to void? If void is 0, the emerging *new* is something *like* 1. It is as such because, at the point where difference almost completely disappears, void, or 0, produces the opposite, in other words produces something new like 1. And the *new* arose on the edge of void *after* this. It should also be noted that neither the void itself - , "it will be unique because one cannot differentiate a different sort of void" (Badiou 2007a: 5) - nor the difference, which has vanished and become almost nothing, has disappeared entirely; and void is present as void of whatever situation it was before difference. Therefore, the new in the emergence of the first singleton –together with the initial void, is the "new" of 0 0 1, for now there is the unique void and the void of the situation and a *new* state. This situation could also be explicated from another viewpoint as follows:

Subtraction is at the same time the affirmation of the difference, which is by logic regarded as negation. And affirmation is in fact the act of count-as-one. The void which is from the very beginning positioned by the basic difference that *finds expression* in the logic of "nothing belongs to unpresentable", the unique void, contains nothing. In other words, void, or nothing, actually refers to what is [...] absent, or no-thing (Hallward 2003: 100). Indeed, to put more precisely, it does not contain anything but this absence. And with this being of absent is revealed the identity of the void, in brief, it is affirmed. That there *is* absence is new. Because the initial void does not contain anything apart from absent, this new is, first of all, what comes *after* the void and its absence. And there is a minimal, if any, difference, which vanish, between absence and the being of absence. Indeed, because void does not contain anything, the being of absence barely exists. It is as if present. Therefore, if void is signified by 0 (zero), that void contains absent should be signified by 0, and that being of absent *exists* should be signified by 1. Therefore, as we indicated above, the emergence of the first singleton becomes 0 0 1 with the initial void.

In the statement "nothing does not belong to unpresentable", however, lies a destructive negative negation towards the gap which is present in the beginning, or towards the fundamental difference, expressed by "nothing belongs to unpresentable". This statement does not accept the "nothing belongs to unpresentable" statement's expressing the unpresentable with a "difference". It rejects the difference. It places a difference from a difference. What exactly does it do then? It, first of all, rejects the difference that finds expression in "nothing belongs to unpresentable", enunciating thereof that a difference is present that is *prior to* the difference. Next it points at the *prior-to*-difference of the difference posited by "nothing belongs to unpresentable", the difference that vanishes as difference, the no-difference, thus prior-to-gap and the no-gap. It is as such because the difference of "nothing does not belong to unpresentable", which is another expression of the unpresentable, is positioned before this difference.

What does it mean that there is no gap? We already dealt with the presence of void as a consequence of difference. There we called the 'almost being of absent of void' as 1. Now however we need to discuss the non-being of void. As a matter of fact, we see that the gap is not in the light of the *indicated expression*. In other words, we see that it has vanished entirely… In as much as previously we assign 1 to almost present as the opposite of absent of void, now we should also call this 1 as we have encountered another opposite situation. The difference of "nothing belongs to unpresentable" has vanished, yet its negative negation, that is, the difference of "nothing does not belong to unpresentable", has now appeared backward. This difference, as 0, comes after 1, which denotes the no-gap after the vanishing. It is as such because the *no*-gap state following vanishing has inevitably fallen behind the difference that places a difference from a difference and that comes before it. In addition, just as in the first proposition, the difference is radical in this proposition. The only difference between the two is that the no-gap is always pointed to be before in the second proposition. By the way, the no-gap here may not necessarily indicate the "closeness" of the gap. In fact, it is more like that it means there is no gap following the vanishing and no gap, thus no difference, is made mention of.

It hereby means that while the emergence of the first singleton – together with the initial void- as a result of the first proposition is 0 0 1, now the reverse of this situation backward in the second proposition can be signified by 1 0 0. What follows is an illustration of a few steps of the counting back:

No-gap emerging backward came out with a difference. Indeed, this time the negation of the difference and the difference is radical towards the *real* no-gap just as the affirmation of the difference and the difference is radical in the first proposition. There is always a difference rejecting the difference together with the second proposition, and this difference is also bound to be rejected in a process that is pointed in the direction of a priori. The rejection is existent here in the form of negative negation. And all

negative negations of difference can be taken, thus, as 1 0: the no-gap state that appears backward and every single rejection of difference … When the prior negation of difference is jotted down backward, the new situation will read 1 0 1 0. When denoted including the beginning, we will have
1 0 1 0
1 0
0 .
Thus, the 0 1 pair, emerging each time the affirmative negation produces a new *state,* has *already* been situated as a priori, having changed directions in the form of 1 0. Now the counting is not as follows: 0 0 1 0 1 0 1… Now it is as this: …1 0 1 0 1 0 0. The first counting goes to *a posteriori,* whereas the second one to *a priori*. Thus, the situations at the Pascal Triangle reduced to 0 1 of both counting, the Pascal Triangle and its reverse are shown in Figure 3.

………………
1 0 1 0 1 0 10 ↑
1 0 1 0 ↑The reversed Pascal Triangle with 01 denoting and counting
1 0 ↑towards priori.
0
↓ 0 1
↓ 0101 The Pascal Triangle with 01 denoting and
↓ 01 0 1 0 1 0 1 counting towards posteriori.
……………..

Figure 3

As can be seen in Figure 3, domain of Two has widened compared to the previous one upon taking of counting forward and backward together. Two, now, is valid in both counting backward and the togetherness of counting forward and backward. Two has come to balance with the discovery of One without gap after one with gap. The situation with gap and the situation without gap each have a beginning. The beginning is void, or 0 in the former, while it is One, i.e. a complete no-gap, in the latter. Therefore, each situation can be taken separately and they can be taken together. We have devoted considerable place to taking them separately. As for taking them together, we should first look once again at the unity of any part, with or without gap, and then at the possibilities of bringing the two parts side by side.

Parts With and Without One and the Ultimate Representation

Let's take, first, the part without One. Earlier in item 6 of the recap section, we maintained that "the difference is repeated twice, one prior to and one in the enunciation of being, and remains forever in the potential of other enunciations of being". And to highlight this repeating, we used the symbol # and the space, or the gap, which sets them apart. Two was denoted as # # on a higher representation thereof. Two has now found expression again by the repeating representation of the differences. The first difference is the first #, the prior of 0 and 1 unity, i.e. the difference of the prior-to-enunciation of the being. The second difference, however, shows the difference between 0 and 1. The former shows the first of the two status of Two, and the latter shows the second. As it is, it is the representation of the inability-to-be-an-exact-one, of the Two differences that we could count up to one, that is the representation of Two. Put differently, the representation is the depiction of the structure of the first singleton from the beginning. As to the part without One, this picture was formulized in the theorem of set by Badiou as follows: {Ø, {Ø}}.

The same logic applies to counting backward up to one in the part with One. And although the representation of Two does not change, the new formula of {Ø, {Ø}} sought for in the set theory needs to be explained this time because of the operation of counting backward. We will continue with our analysis, delaying this explanation to some later study for now.

A close inspection of Figure 3 reveals that counting, both forward and backward, is toward 1. It bears a difference though: 1 is the 1 of count-as-one in counting forward, whereas 1 is 1 toward the One-without-gap in counting backward. And both in counting forward and counting backward, the difference, except for the One itself, remains. It remains both because the difference wherein "nothing belongs to unpresentable" is situated is radical and because the difference of "nothing does not belong to unpresentable", which places a difference from a difference, rejects difference. What remains is the representation of this difference #, for we principally demonstrate the difference by that. In addition, in the relation # # showing Two, it may come before it, as well as after it. When it comes before, i.e. when the difference is that of counting backward, if the situation of negative affirmation is true, this difference indicates the backward emergence of One. It is as such because what rejects is not each of the difference, but it is itself all along. On the one hand, there is # indicating One as the difference of counting backward, and on the other hand, there is # # indicating Two. Thus, the relation between One and Two, when the part with One is taken, is as follows:

#
. However,

if the difference remains as the difference of counting forward, in other words if it always remains as *after* and if it is the situation of affirmative negation, this difference always shows 1 towards forward, in the direction of count-as-one. And in this situation, it is not the difference of counting forward, or each of the propagating difference, but again it is difference #, which is itself all along, and # # indicating Two. And thus, taking the part without One will become

# #
 #

In addition to all these, it could also be that the two parts can be taken together. In other words, it can be shown in the from-priori-to-posteriori relation, which ends up in the following situation:

 #
# #
 #

And this is a representation from One to Two and from Two to One. When the Beginning and End are taken together, that is when a circle is established, the sample system looks like Hegelian system (Figure 4).

 #
# #
 #

Figure 4.

Then, representation of the beginning situations with and without One is possible with #. This is through the possibility of a single representation of "One"ness and "distinct"ness; representation with # is actually an implicit representation of this. In other words, at all times, # is used to show difference, but "different" differences… Sometimes indirectly Two, sometimes indirectly One, and sometimes the remaining difference is shown.

Something is worth noting about taking the parts with and without One together: both parts coincide at the base of Two. Hence, Sameness is in question, but there is before the Sameness (the One direction) and after the Sameness (the direction after Two).

We have, thus, analyzed the taking of the parts with and without One separately and together from priori to posteriori. It should be noted here that the possibilities of the representation are not restricted to this. The parts with and without One are opposite of each other, and they can come together from priori to posteriori, and they can be thought in other resultant forms as well. There are exactly a total of 4 different resultant matches: Priori-priori, priori-posteriori, posteriori-priori, and posteriori-posteriori. Even if we eliminate priori- priori and posteriori-posteriori alternatives as meaningless, the posteriori-priori alternative technically seems to point at he opposite of Hegelian system (Figure 5).

#   #
#
#   #

(Figure 5)

At this point from which we departed assumption-based, we have not comprehended yet how Figure 5, i.e. the relation from Two to One and from One to Two, could be interpreted. Maybe this option will be absurd and need to be put away, but again we are not sure whether to do it or not. The only certain thing is that One's relation with Two from priori to posteriori has an ultimate representation (Figure 6).

#
#   #

(Figure 6)

This representation is basically the representation of One's relation with Two, but neither One nor Two is in the representation. Still yet, the representation hinges on differences, and One and Two could be pointed at in terms of *difference*. Nevertheless, One is still not difference. As it is, it demonstrates that the absolute beginning is neither One nor Two but that One and Two is together. What is more, the representation exhibits 'sameness' and 'distinctness' together with the symbol #.

Finally…

Under these circumstances, in the balanced representation of Two, it is not that Two can be taken by itself alone. Now we can assert that what brings Two to balance is the status of One. It is One that lines up. This is best understood in the representation in Figure 6. This status has not only balanced Two, but also rendered possible the ontology founded on void as well as its opposite. This is so because both the counting on Pascal's Triangle reduced to 01 and the inverse counting have demonstrated how they are possible. As a matter of fact, both the ontology that forms the base of void and the reverse-ontology that forms the base of the no-gap are an outcome of this representation. What remains is the interpretation of the representation.

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