

EMOTIONAL LABOR IN PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that Hegel's use of the notion of feeling in his work Phenomenology of Spirit differs from its conceptualization as immediate, passive, irrational and private sensation which leads to the exclusion of feelings from the pursuit of the consciousness in coming to know itself in Phenomenology of Spirit. In the first part of the paper the difference between feeling as organic irritability and feeling as essential moodiness of the subject is clarified. In the latter sense, feelings are understood as universal active, determinative and transformative moods. Understood as such, they play essential roles in the dialectical development of self-consciousness in that they trigger and continue the process by moving consciousness negatively through forming and dissolving particular phases of self-consciousness. In order to show that the possibility of the further development of self-consciousness is opened up by the feeling and that the developmental process necessitates emotional formative labor, the next two parts examine the roles of two particular feelings, fear and sorrow, in the formation of the Servile Consciousness and the Unhappy (Religious) Consciousness in Phenomenology of Spirit respectively. Through this analysis, the paper examines the Hegelian concept of rationality, contributes to the reevaluation of Hegel's negative attitude towards feelings, offers a broadened critical perspective on feelings without reducing them into pure irrational cases and challenges the dogmatic, reductive and antithetical judgments on irrationality and irrationality

Keywords: G. W. F. Hegel, Subject, Emotion, Mood, Rationality, Self-consciousness, Servile Consciousness, Unhappy Consciousness

(Tinin Fenomenolojisi'nde Duygusal Emek)

ÖZET

Bu makale Hegel'in Tinin Fenomenolojisi adlı eserindeki duygu kavramını kullanımını duyguların adı geçen eserde bilincin kendini bilme uğraşının dışına düşmesine sebep olan dolaylı, pasif, irrasyonel ve kişisel bir duygulanım olarak kavramsallaştırılmasından farklı olduğunu savunmaktadır. Makalenin ilk bölümünde canlılığa dair bir duyarlılık olarak duygu ve öznenin özüne dair yönelimli olma hali olarak duygu arasında fark ortaya konulmaktadır. İkinci anlamıyla duygular evrensel aktif, belirleyici ve dönüştürücü modlar olarak anlaşılır. Böyle anlaşıldıklarında duygular bilincin kendilik bilinci haline geçişinde belirli bilinç fazlarının oluşturulup çözülmesinde, dolayısıyla da kendilik bilincinin diyalektik gelişiminin harekete geçirilip devam ettirilmesinde vazgeçilemez bir role sahiptirler. Kendilik bilincinin gelişiminin olasılığının duygu tarafından kurulduğunu ve gelişimsel sürecin duygunun biçimlendirici emeğini gerektirdiğini göstermek için makalenin devam eden iki bölümünde Tinin Fenomenolojisi'nde korku ve keder hallerinin sırasıyla kölelik bilinci ve mutsuz (dini) bilinç formlarının kuruluşunda oynadıkları roller incelenmektedir. Bu analiz dolayısıyla makale Hegelci akılsallık kavramını incelemekte, Hegel'in duygulara karşı olumsuz tavrının yeniden değerlendirilmesine katkıda bulunmakta, duygular üzerine genişletilmiş eleştirel bir bakış açısı sunmakta, ve rasyonellik ve irrasyonellik kavramlarına dair dogmatik, indirgeyici ve zıt yargılara karşı çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: G. W. F. Hegel, Özne, Duygu, Mod, Akılsallık, Kendilik bilinci, Kölelik Bilinci, Mutsuz Bilinç.

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Introduction

In his book *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit*, Robert Stern introduces Hegel's philosophical aim in *Phenomenology of Spirit* [*Phenomenology*] as guiding the ordinary consciousness, which is despaired by intellectual and practical contradictions, to feel at home with itself in the world.¹ Stern's idea that *Phenomenology* may be interpreted as a guide for the subject's radical search for feeling at home in the world seems to be easily refutable by affirming the incompatibility between, in Robert C. Solomon's description, Hegel's "superrationality" and the irrationality immediately associated with the notion of feeling.² Accordingly, in *Phenomenology* consciousness cannot be observed to be passively in need of an irrational subjective self-feeling but to be actively seeking objective self-knowledge. The reason is that, simply, feeling happens. One cannot help feeling in one way or another. It is inward, immediate, without labor, lawless, private, asocial and irrational. Understood as such, it is the direct opposite of the thoroughly mediated objectifying work of the self in coming to know itself in *Phenomenology*. Contrary to these characterizations and the consequent idea, in what follows I would like to show how in *Phenomenology* feeling triggers and keeps the development of self-consciousness on and in that sense this development essentially includes emotional labor. The proposal is to view Hegelian feeling as a mood that is, a way of relating and tending towards, which elaborates and works out as well as being elaborated and worked out. To know what it is to be a self is a truly emotional engagement for Hegel and Hegel's most crucial articulations in *Phenomenology*, such as the significance of the life for self-consciousness, self-consciousness' description as desire, its finding its truth in the spiritual activity or the concreteness of the concept, refer to the role of feeling. According to Hegel consciousness does not happen to feel at home or lost. It actively and emotionally labors to make the world its home through certain moods which shape both the self-consciousness and the world.

¹ Robert Stern, *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit* (London: Routledge, 2002), see pp. 11-21. Stern also emphasizes that according to Hegel we find ourselves at home in the world when we look at the world rationally and "the world looks rationally back." G. W. F. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, trans. by Leo Rauch (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), p.14.

² Robert C. Solomon, "Existentialism, Emotions, and the Cultural Limits of Rationality," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol.42, No.4 (1992), pp. 597-621; p. 598.

1. Feelings as Active, Transformative and Determinative Moods

Solomon writes that superrationality is falsely attributed to Hegel's philosophy and it is akin to the one which is ascribed to Kant's philosophy.³ Although Kantian strict rationality dispelling feeling from both the theoretical and practical efforts of reason is not on a par with Hegelian rationality, *Phenomenology's* abundance with negative evaluations of sentiments, intuitions and passions contributes to this characterization. In Judith N. Shklar's words, that "Hegel was, in fact, obsessively irritated by the flourishing sentimentality of his age" which is overflowed by philosophical, artistic or religious "'beautiful souls', worshippers of sincerity and other types of self-cultivating sensitive spirits" is clearly apparent in the preface of *Phenomenology*.⁴ Hegel writes that the beautiful, the holy, the eternal and love are "the bait required to arouse the desire to bite; not the Notion, but the ecstasy, not the cold march of necessity in the thing itself, but the ferment of enthusiasm ..." (§ 7).⁵ For him, truth is not "the esoteric possession of a few individuals" (§ 13) which is intuited immediately "like a shot from a pistol" (§ 27). Truth has a universal form and the right owner of it is mature self-conscious reason. It is impossible for the truth to be felt immediately and to be captured subjectively. Moreover, throughout *Phenomenology* all the forms of self-consciousness which are explicitly shaped by feeling; such as the one finding its truth in the law of the heart (§ 367-380) or the other capturing its truth in the beauty of the soul (§ 655-59) are presented as moral failures. However, rejecting passion as the

³ Solomon, *ibid.*, pp.597-9. Solomon writes that Hegel's preference of using Kantian terminology leads to the association of the Kantian rationality and Hegelian rationality. According to him, Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as superrational in so far as it is placed on the opposite pole of philosophies which "bypassed reason" in favor of "heart," "irrational leap," "faith," "absurdity," "criterionless" or "personal." Most of these philosophies' criticisms which are directed on Hegel's strict rationality, and which Solomon gathers under the title of existentialism, are based on this contrasting categorization. The readings of Hegel which highlight rational comprehension as the sole drive of Hegelian dialectic and underestimate feelings as the occurrences to be sublimated support this categorization implicitly, no matter how strong they point at the inclusion of the feelings and irrational elements into the Hegelian dialectic. Against such an understanding of rationality, I argue that emotions drive the dialectic of self-consciousness. Hegel's position can be taken to be the leading example of the proposal that rational and irrational are not necessarily opposite qualities.

⁴ Judith N. Shklar, "Hegel's *Phenomenology*: The Moral Failures of Asocial Man," *Political Theory*, Vol.1, No. 3 (1973), pp. 259-286; p. 263.

⁵ George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). References to the work are given in the text by using paragraph numbers in parentheses.

bearer of truth does not mean advocating scientific reason armed with its fixed, external and abstract categories, firm methods, measurements, and mathematical certainties. In the part called "Observing Reason" of *Phenomenology*, Hegel explicitly shows how scientific rationality comes to realize the arbitrariness and abstractness of the universal schemas and regularities of thought in comparison to the variety and activity of living nature; and the individuality and the self-determinative act of the subject (§§ 240-347). As Donald Verene stresses, scientific understanding kills the life-world in thought, while observing reason reflecting on itself transforms the subject into a skull.⁶ In addition, ethical consciousness in the form of universally legislating and testing reason, that is, in the form of practical reason, realizes that it is purely rational, yet it is nothing but a bundle of formal laws without a connection to the life and the real reasons of actions (§§ 419-437). In both cases, rationality petrifies subjectivity: theoretical reason produces a thing while practical reason makes action in the life-world impossible. Thus, Hegel's negative evaluations of feelings which interpret Hegel as excluding feeling from consciousness's efforts or as downgrading it point to an error because these negative evaluations refer to those cases where Hegel detects extremity and one-sidedness. Hegel keeps the same distance to extreme rationality as he keeps to extreme sentimentality. Both feeling and reason fails in grasping the truth because they are one-sided and partial. However, their failure does not mean that they should be dispelled from consciousness' path of development. Rather, it implies that their fixed sense should be resolved and re-evaluated. Hence, neither feeling is completely irrational, nor reason passionless.

Contrary to its common definition as the passive impulsive state, the reformulation of the Hegelian concept of feeling, following Solomon, refers to the description of it as active, determinative and laborious.⁷ The suggestion aims to make the determinative aspect of feeling more apparent. This aspect can be captured more properly if feeling is understood as a mood.⁸ Mood is associated with the terms 'tone', 'tune', 'temper', 'atmosphere', 'conditioning' and 'mode' which rescue feeling from the atomizing and isolating perspective. Understanding feeling as a mood also

⁶ Donald P. Verene, *Hegel's Absolute: An Introduction to Reading the Phenomenology of Spirit* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp.1-2.

⁷ See Robert C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Really Telling Us* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Solomon writes that the idea that emotions are neuro-physiological states which correspond to ineffable, stupid and irrational passive sensations is a myth.

⁸ See also John Russon, "Emotional Subjects: Mood and Articulation in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.49 (2009), pp. 41-52.

rescues feeling from its psychological overtone in that mood does not point to a specific object. Mood opens or precludes certain possibilities and acts: a mood for writing or a mood for murder. It is connected to freedom, and it has a practical and ethical significance. It is not a fact, but an act in the sense that it interprets, evaluates and most importantly it chooses and transforms. The striving aspect of the transformative act, on the other hand, can be articulated by the help of Sartre's conception of emotion. Sartre prefers the term emotion rather than feeling to cover all these characteristics mentioned.⁹ Emotion, he writes, "is a certain way of apprehending the world" and "a transformation of the world" through the change of this apprehension.¹⁰ Emotion changes that which it relates radically: "every emotional apprehension of an object which frightens, irritates, saddens, etc., can be made only on the basis of a total alteration of the world."¹¹ The emotion of horror, for example, "spreads itself over the whole future and darkens it; it is a revelation of the meaning of the world. 'The horrible' means precisely that the horrible is a substantial quality; it means that there is the horrible in the world."¹² This constitutive and transformative act, Sartre warns, is not a game. "[W]e are driven against a wall, and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can muster."¹³ That is to say, in order to bear the tension that the feeling, for example, of horror forms and reveals, another attitude should be formed and this formation requires effort because it points to a radical change of the total web of determinations. Thus, by the help of Sartre's conception of emotion the effort of feeling is discovered too.

The same distinction between two senses of feeling, one which points to its passive aspect and the other which brings up the active aspect, can be drawn in *Phenomenology* as well. Hegel's negative approach to

⁹ Solomon, too, prefers the term emotion by arguing that feeling and emotion are not identical. He is uncomfortable with the fact that the term feeling is used to cover a broad range of experiences including uncontrolled bodily sensations and primitive passions. I follow Solomon with regard to the existential perspective he inherited from Sartre that emotion refers to the constitutive engagement in and with the world, yet I use the terms emotion and feeling interchangeably and usually prefer the latter because it has a verb form, to feel. As such, the term feeling expresses the active and determinative aspect of feelings better. See also Robert C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Really Telling Us* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 137-141.

¹⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*, trans. by Bernard Frechtman (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1993), p.52, p. 58.

¹¹ Sartre, *ibid.*, p.87.

¹² Sartre, *ibid.*, p.81.

¹³ Sartre, *ibid.*, p.59.

feeling targets usually feeling in the first sense. This sense is integral to the negativity Hegel attaches to the natural and animal as opposed to the spiritual and human. His statements, for example, that “[t]he anti-human, the merely animal consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level” (§ 69) or that “[t]he animal finishes up with the feeling of self. The instinct of Reason, on the other hand, is at the same time self-consciousness; ...” (§ 258) confirm the distinction. Hegel calls the sensuous determinateness of animals as “determination in terms of irritability” or “organic passivity” in his discussion of organism (§ 282). In his article “Emotional Subjects: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind” John Russon differentiates animal irritability from sensibility. The former refers to the capability of being affected and the latter has much more complex descriptions: “being-awake-within-one’s-determinacy” and “affective being-at-home in determinacy.”¹⁴ According to him, mood is a species of sensibility and it means living within the corporeal (determined) non-differentiated unity of self and its other. One finds herself awake to this unity and this awareness continues accompanying the individual as life continues. “Mood is the way we live in a world that reflects our subjectivity back to us.”¹⁵ Expressed in Hegelian terms, mood makes life for consciousness itself. Expressed in simple terms, that one feels means that life is her life. Therefore, sensibility or moodiness, contrary to irritability, belongs to human subjectivity. By calling the feeling as affective determination, Russon emphasizes the affective aspect rather than the effective (determining) aspect of the feeling, but his distinction still helps in pointing out which passivity is degraded by Hegel. The conclusion is that Hegel downplays feeling in the sense of irritability, whereas moodiness belongs to the necessary dimension of being a self.

Viewing the development of self-consciousness in *Phenomenology* as the self-formative activity of a moody consciousness, in the following parts I would like to focus on the first two of the four basic feelings that motivate and sustain particular stages of the development of self-consciousness. The feelings indispensable for the formation of self-consciousness are fear, sorrow, resentment and shame. Fear molds self-consciousness into the shape of a slave (§ 178-196). Sorrow moves consciousness to form an unchangeable for itself and it makes the unchangeable its truth (§ 197-230). Resentment fills the heart of the lawful consciousness and that of the virtuous one (§ 376-393). It works for the

¹⁴ Russon, *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁵ Russon, *ibid.*, p. 45.

actualization of rational consciousness. Shame brings an end to the deception of the individual that she is honestly universal and transforms her to a legislator and a judge (§ 394-437). As the process goes on, feelings recur. For example, enlightened reason moves resentfully (§ 538-582), or at the end of the spiritual journey of consciousness fear becomes the reason why soul is shot into its beautiful conscience: fear of losing its purity which is its reality; itself (§ 632-671). In addition, alignment of these four particular feelings manifests the close link of feeling to desire and to negativity. These feelings, in their negative characters, demand a recovery of a loss. Fearful self demands securing itself, self in sorrow desires tranquility, resentful self wants evenness and finally shameful self wants redemption.¹⁶ Instead of recovery, however, suffering continues so that self-consciousness can continue growing. Hence, these feelings carry out “the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative” (§ 19).

2. Formative Role of Fear in the Servile Consciousness

In *Hegel: The Restlessness of Negative* Jean-Luc Nancy gives the core of the Hegelian journey of consciousness’ becoming conscious of itself point-blank: “The compact density of simple subsistence must be shattered, whether it be the density of the stone, the ego, the whole, God or signification.”¹⁷ In *Phenomenology* the succession of shatterings begins with the dissolution of the subsistence of things sensed and perceived. When consciousness turns to itself and starts taking itself to be an issue, what it senses of itself at first is not the subsistence of something like that of the stone but “a fluid substance of pure movement” of dissolution and production of differences (§ 169). This pure incessant movement refers to the life of consciousness. Hegel’s introduction of self-consciousness by means of a description of life has a twofold importance. The first one is that self-consciousness is born and it senses itself alive. It is not like the act through which the self takes “the stone out of its mineral abstraction” and the stone takes the self out of its “spiritual mass.”¹⁸ Rather, life dissolves consciousness into its true movement. Hence, life is the first self that consciousness relates itself to. However, it is also the whole self. Its status as

¹⁶ These are some of the examples Solomon gives for explaining emotion’s ideological demand for satisfaction. See Solomon 1987: 273.

¹⁷ Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of Negative*, trans. by Jason Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p.40.

¹⁸ Nancy, *ibid.*, p.58.

the whole self of the consciousness pins down the second importance. Hegel describes the sense of life which is essential for self-consciousness as consciousness' "feeling of its unity with itself" (§ 171). Throughout *Phenomenology*, consciousness forms its unity with itself *through* different forms of life and *as* those forms of life which are more and more articulated and which all together constitute the whole life of the self. The truth of self-consciousness is not its unity with one shape of itself, but its unity with its whole life. Thus, consciousness' most simple and primitive form of life which is consciousness' "awakening to itself" disappears into one moment of the pure movement of its whole life, that is, into a moment of the truth. With the conception of life as a self-developing whole; to wit, with the conception of self as life-developing whole, Hegel inverts the meaning of consciousness' disunity with itself. The shattering turns to be referring to side-tracking of consciousness. If consciousness' unity with itself means being on the right track with the pure movement of its whole progress, breaking its unity is not breaking its fixity but breaking the movement. Understanding this twofold significance of life for consciousness is the beginning point of appreciating the role of the fear of death in the growth of the self. Fear of death expresses the fear of losing the whole life. Fear expresses the necessary bond to life.

At the developmental stage preceding the experience of fear, the unity of consciousness is figured as being "Desire in general" (§ 169). Living consciousness' being a flow of desire is in parallel with life's being a pure movement. Attractive but easily consumable living shapes mushroom in the world of desire, consciousness keeps itself alive by submerging itself into the life of this world, and it is self-content. Hegel thinks that in this world of lust no true self-relation is possible because, in order to relate to itself, that is, in order to be *self-conscious*, consciousness should posit that which it takes to be a self. It should come outside of itself and return back to itself. Since living consciousness is *desire*, it should relate to the desire itself and since *living consciousness* is desire it should relate to the living consciousness itself. Consequently, what it posits and faces is the same with it, it is its *self*, but in *another* shape: a *Dobbligänger* or a dead ringer. It is the same living and desiring consciousness as an alien presence.

The relation of the twin consciousnesses becomes a struggle in which each wills the annulment of the other because both of them, as desires, want the life of the other. Desire of murder, however, equals to desire of suicide because each of the twins is the same self and each one catches itself in the other. The face-to-face position turns to be a moment in

which the death is faced. One of the consciousnesses feels the dread of “the absolute Lord,” trembles “in every fiber of its being,” feels the absolute groundlessness (§ 194). “In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness” (§ 189). The other consciousness feels nothing in its self-affirmation. Fearful consciousness chooses life, shrinks back and acknowledges that its life, that is, its selfhood, depends on the other. Consequently, it forms a depended and obedient self, whereas the other gets its independent and master self. In these two forms of self-consciousness their relation to each other is settled down. Thus, the twin consciousnesses split into two different shapes of self-consciousness as a result of their attitude in the moment of facing death. Fearful consciousness transforms its world to an intersubjective world, given that it acknowledges the other as a self in its otherness, as the Master. “[S]elf-relation in relation to an other” that Robert Pippin picks out as the formula of Hegelian idealism finds its simple form in the servile characteristics of consciousness.¹⁹ Moreover, the Servile Consciousness works for the Master, so its appetitive act has a new form as labor, as a formative activity. On the other hand, the Master is stuck with its world of appetitive desire, continues its consumption and enjoyment with a difference that it has a tool for its enjoyment now. It is trapped in its certainty by the Servile Consciousness. This picture of the process clarifies how Hegel inverts the meanings of the notions of independency and dependency. It is the Servile Consciousness which keeps moving in the figure of the worker through its transformative negation, while the Master is dependent on the Servile Consciousness both for its recognition and for gratification.

Although the feeling of fear through which life is chosen has a role in shaping the Servile Consciousness, it does not show up its boundary role, if the servant is considered to be, in Quentin Lauer’s words, simply “willing to relinquish his *humanity* in order to preserve his *animality*.”²⁰ The importance of the role of fear can be crystallized by clarifying consciousness’ being desire in general and by stressing the transformative and spiritual activity of the Servile Consciousness which shapes the desire. As the naïve life of the animal is never the whole life of self-consciousness, the choice of life is never the choice of mere survival. The choice refers to the possibility of the development of consciousness through which it realizes itself as the free individual, in other words, as the true self. Indeed,

¹⁹ Robert B. Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.154.

²⁰ Quentin Lauer, S. J., *A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), p.129.

this choice refers to the possibility that natural existence can be worked on so that it is sublated into spiritual existence. As Georges Bataille and Jonathan Strauss sum up, “[t]he animal dies. But the death of the animal is the becoming of consciousness.”²¹ Fear makes possible the becoming of consciousness. Hegel writes that “consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized by dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord” and the experience of fear is the moment of “absolute melting-away of everything stable” (§ 194). This experience is the recognition that self depends purely on itself, it is on its own, and nothing or no one but itself is responsible for the formation of its truth. In a sense, feeling of dread is the awareness that murder and suicide is so easy. Expressed in Hegel’s terminology, everything in itself is for the self, nothing is in itself.

The experience of “being-for-self” is the point where consciousness finds its truth. Being-for-self constitutes the way the desire in general is. It refers to the continuing movement of appropriation, the movement of taking the otherness in, making it its own and grasping it. In the form of the Slave, consciousness grasps that it itself is the pure moving negativity which melts everything away, not the natural death. The difference of the work of the Servile Consciousness from the appetitive consciousness is that labor negates by sublation. While shaping the thing, the Servile Consciousness implicitly transforms “the pure being-for-self” which has become an object for it (§ 196). *Qua* desire in general, self-consciousness is the pure being-for-self; consequently, self-consciousness shapes its own self, its own life. It is possible that one can work without the experience of fear or one can feel afraid of some particular things including natural death. In the former case, consciousness would remain as the self-centered desire. It is the initial unity that consciousness forms with itself as appetitive lust. In the latter case, negativity would stay external to consciousness and could not be internalized as one’s truth. In parallel line to the conceptions of “whole life” of self-consciousness and its being “desire in general,” fear is the “universal mode” of self-consciousness (§ 196). In conclusion, fear is the feeling that consciousness is radically free from all other determinants, since the only one capable of saving life and the only one to be responsible for life’s determination is the consciousness itself. Fear is the sense of the loss of unity, but also makes the continuity of the purely negative movement

²¹ Georges Bataille and Jonathan Strauss, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” *Yale French Studies*, No. 78 (1990), pp. 9-28; p. 1.

possible by transforming it to the formative activity of the work; hence, it sustains the unity of consciousness with itself in a sublated level. It determines the Servile Consciousness as the departure of making life one's own. In the background, fear makes independence possible.

3. Formative Role of Sorrow in the Unhappy Consciousness

In addition to fear, the feeling of sorrow is the second feeling which forges a new form of self-consciousness in *Phenomenology*. Hegel uses the feeling sorrow in naming the form of consciousness and so the new form is named after this specific feeling: the Unhappy Consciousness. Sorrow sets off with the skeptic turn of self-consciousness following the stoic form and creates the fully-fledged unhappy mode of consciousness which is a form of religious consciousness. In stoic and skeptic figures consciousness tries to form its unity with itself through identifying its negative movement with two different flows. Stoic consciousness unifies itself with the movement of pure thought, while skeptic one acknowledges the chaotic flow of existence as its truth. Given that factual life is asserted as the truth which is supposed to be the unchanging universal because truth is universal, and yet it cannot be so in its meaningless chaotic particularity, consciousness feels the unreachable gulf which separates itself from its truth, from itself. The inner contradiction of skeptic consciousness turns to be the painful experience of the duality of the self. Consciousness is dual as being both stoic and skeptic. This disparity leads to the creation of an image of a "beyond" as the foundation of the unity.

The sorrowful consciousness relates itself to this beyond in three ways: through "the inner movement of the pure heart," through turning back to the activities of work and consumption, and finally through the ascetic divine service (§ 217).²² In the mood of sorrow, self-consciousness jumps the shark. The more consciousness tries to free itself from sorrow, the more distant from itself it falls, the more agonizing its act becomes. Thus, new but useless would-be unities are formed because the feeling, having triggered the process, intensifies and demands resolution. Sorrow creates God and self-consciousness transforms itself in order to change the way God is which, in turn, is because one wants to recover from sorrow. Hence, the mood of sorrow constitutes the core of the religious

²² See also Robert Stern, *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit* (London: Routledge, 2002); pp. 85-96.

consciousness and affects all its activities. More importantly, however, the Unhappy Consciousness in the last one of its three shapes completely becomes a selfless *thing*. Labor of sorrow brings consciousness to its limit and topples it into the sphere of reason. Like fear, sorrow pushes consciousness to its next stage in *Phenomenology*. Left with a thinghood, in order to understand itself, self-consciousness in the form of reason firstly observes the inorganic *thing*, then passes to the living *thing* and ends with the skull which is the dead *thing*.

Hegel explains the passage of the Servile Consciousness to the stoic stage by the recoil of the Servile Consciousness into its inwardness with the hope of discovering its truth there. The Servile Consciousness works on its independence but is still dependent on the Master. So it is not independently depended as it should be. In its inner world the Servile Consciousness identifies itself with "*thinking consciousness in general*" (§ 197). Hegel states that "[i]n thinking, I *am free*, because I am not in an *other*, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself" (§ 197). Consciousness gets its unity with itself in the movement of thought which is only for itself, because "the object, which is for me the *essential* being, is in an undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my activity in conceptual thinking is a movement within myself" (§ 197). Moreover, the movement of thought seems to have the necessary negativity in that it negates what happens in life in order to conserve the pureness, abstractness and formality, that is to say, it negates in order to preserve the universality of its concepts. The form of negation of life by abstraction instead of its negation by desire and work cannot answer to "the fullness" of life and cannot determine it, so consciousness cannot objectify itself. Hence, freedom "in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life" (§ 200).

On the other hand skeptic consciousness cannot accomplish self-liberation either, for it rejects the universality completely. While stoic consciousness thinks that it is the universal which costs it the existing reality, skeptic consciousness is "a purely casual, confused medley, the dizziness of a perpetually self-engendered disorder" without any substantiality (§ 205). Skeptic consciousness identifies itself with the pure flow of aimless change, yet it is an act of identification; to wit, it has a unifying role. In its assertion that its *essence* is this contingent particularity, it already shows that it is not this contingent, particular, separate life. As being both individual and universal, both essential and contingent, both existent and thought, both self-liberating and self-bewildering, consciousness is the "*lost self-consciousness*" (§ 205). In place of a self it

possesses an internal contradiction. The feeling of sorrow is the self-feeling of the inwardly disrupted consciousness.

The sorrow which is felt in the face of the internal contradictions reshapes the pursuit of consciousness in such a way that the search for the unity of consciousness with itself becomes the explicit search for the unity of the differences or contradictions of consciousness with itself. Given that the contradictory dual nature manifests itself internally and is felt inwardly, the unification is addressed to something external and beyond. However, addressing to the beyond duplicates the duality instead of constituting unity. The beyond is pictured as the essential and unchangeable, while consciousness posits itself as the inessential and changeable. The allotment never allows the unity to be constituted *by* the living self, because in that case the unity which is supposed to be unchanging would remain contingent and destructible. Unity should be constituted on the side of the unchangeable *and by* it. Although the presentation of the unchangeable does not put an end to the misery, it still moves self-consciousness into an advanced stage in comparison to the stoic and skeptic ones. The Unhappy Consciousness is the moment of relation of individuality to universality. Consciousness is aware of itself as the individual who *thinks* and it posits the unchangeable as an *individual*. "But what it does not know is that this its object, the Unchangeable, which it knows essentially in the form of individuality, is *its own self*, is itself the individuality of the consciousness" (§ 216). Therefore, consciousness attempts to have its unity with this unchangeable taken to be beyond in 3 different routes which, it thinks, affect the unchangeable's effectuation of the unity sought. Sorrow grows and grows.

At first consciousness devotes itself to the unchangeable. It identifies itself with the "inner movement of the pure heart" and feels that this movement constitutes its essence. Through this "infinite, pure inner feeling" consciousness is aware of itself as a particular individual which is same as self-awareness of "the pure *thinking* which *thinks* of itself as a *particular individuality*" (§ 217). Thus, consciousness is certain that it is recognized in its individuality by the pure thought, since feeling exists on its own independently and individually. In truth, it is the self-recognition of consciousness in the form of the self-feeling. But recognition, for the Unhappy Consciousness, should come externally because it posits the unchangeable beyond and the unchangeable should be beyond because it cannot have a contradictory and unessential being. At the same time, however, it cannot be beyond because unity should be realized in actuality.

Although consciousness feels that it is recognized, its wretchedness does not fade away.

The persistent feeling of unhappiness and the urge to be rescued from it transform consciousness' devotion to the unchangeable into the feeling of gratitude, which constitutes the second attempt for unification with the unchangeable. This time consciousness relates to the unchangeable by working, consuming and feeling gratitude for the supplier of the skills and senses which are used in these activities. For Hegel as long as consciousness sees its truth in a form of movement, no matter how erroneous it is, it is on the right route towards becoming itself. However, the movement constituted by gratitude is not the necessary negative movement of appetite or labor, but an affirmative one. Consciousness affirms that the actuality, whether it refers to the actuality of its powers and capacities or to the actuality of the world which it works on and enjoys, has the "form of the Unchangeable, it is unable to nullify it" (§ 220). The situation of the self-consciousness worsens and the disunity of the self-consciousness becomes more fixated by its split form its own powers and the world. The actuality of the world is null and it should be so for the realization of self-liberation because the world remains as the other for the consciousness and otherness should be appropriated. On the other hand, it is a sanctified world. Having been originated by the unchangeable, it cannot be annihilated. The only act possible for consciousness is to thank for the gift. Thanking is accepting that consciousness eludes the possession and responsibility for its own act. It assigns the responsibility to the beyond, for it admits that actuality including its active being belongs to the beyond. Consciousness denies its freedom in order to unify itself with the beyond. Far from bringing unity, this denial brings about the awareness of the extreme individuality. Consciousness, as a particular individual, becomes aware of its will and power of sacrifice. The awareness of the extreme independence of individuality throws consciousness to a remote position from the unchangeable which becomes the other extreme. The unhappiness increasing incrementally channels the consciousness to the last form of relation as the ultimate remedy for the consciousness' disunity with itself.

Hegel states that the ultimate remedy for sorrow is to consult to the conciliator. Realizing that to attribute all the responsibility of its act to the unchangeable ends in a deeper deprivation, The Unhappy Consciousness backpedals for the last time and attributes its act not the unchangeable but to another conscious being: to a mediator. Two extremes are presented to each other in the actuality of the mediator and the relation is ministered

successfully. Consciousness' action is determined as coming from the decision of someone else connected directly to the unchangeable who knows the requirements of unification with clarity. Hegel holds that the third relation, as a *mediated* relation, negates the negative moment of consciousness' return to its particular individuality and preserves individuality at the same time, so it shapes an implicit unity with the unchangeable (§ 226). The relation also transforms the particular will to the universal will in such a way that the latter gains its actuality in the form of the conciliator. The unity of individual and universal is attained in actuality. Thus, through the conciliator "consciousness, having nullified the *action* as its own doing, has also *in principle* obtained relief from its *misery*" (§ 230). The relief is in principle because consciousness in its individuality still views itself as the unessential party. It considers the actualization of the universal will as possible only through the conciliator, not as possible through itself. What worst is that the power of sacrifice felt in the preceding relationship is actualized through fasting and mortifications. The actualization of the sacrifice necessitates that consciousness renounces its truth formed independently through labor and enjoyment, since sacrifice announces them as external possessions and demands a total self-renouncement. Consciousness does not will, does not choose, does not work, does not own and does not enjoy. The result of the struggle to unchain the feeling of sorrow is the total deprivation of consciousness from its independence. "It has the certainty of having truly divested itself of its 'I', and having turned its immediate self-consciousness into a *Thing*, into an *objective* existence. Only through this *actual* sacrifice could it demonstrate this self-renunciation" (§ 229). Sorrow, having posited the unchangeable and having set off the movement of the Unhappy Consciousness, grows till it turns the self-consciousness into a stone. The movement, drawing nearly a perfect circle, ends at the observation of the sensuous and perceptible object where the journey of consciousness has taken off. In *Phenomenology*, self-consciousness continues the movement of its becoming by passing to the investigation of the being of the thing in its inorganic and organic forms. Hegel writes that the Unhappy Consciousness does not immediately step into the world of religions, or into the intersubjective ethical order, because what issues from the pain is the immediate presence of the thing (§ 673). Therefore, self-consciousness is transformed into observing reason and it keeps seeking itself in the thing as the immediate presence.

Conclusion

Fear and sorrow are the feelings which are indispensable for the formation of the Servile Consciousness and the Unhappy Consciousness in *Phenomenology* respectively. Both feelings display the active, determinative and transformative features of the mood and they manifest that Hegelian notion of emotion does not refer to passive, irrational and private sensation. In *Phenomenology*, the possibility of the further development of self-consciousness on its way to find its truth is opened by the feelings as universal moods of the selfhood and the work that aims to the realization and completion of this dialectical development is carried out through them. They move consciousness negatively through forming and dissolving particular unities of it with itself by setting a particular form of self-consciousness in motion, keeping up the momentum and dissolving one form into another form. They are necessary to form the relation to that which the self acknowledges as the other; and consequently, emotions as universal moods are exposed to be essential to realize what is to be a self in relation to the other. Indeed, moods do not only raise particular forms, make the consciousness become conscious of its self in these forms and then abandon consciousness. As far as consciousness moves and acts in its pure negativity, given that it seeks its unity with itself in different shapes and yet all shapes turn to be disparity, it carries with fear and sorrow: fear of losing the present unity taken to be the truth and pain of losing the truth. Manifestation of these two feelings as essential to self-consciousness in *Phenomenology* helps us to grasp why Hegel introduces the search of consciousness for *feeling* at home in the world as “the way of despair” (§ 78) and it contributes to shaping a coherent perspective on Hegel’s understanding of emotion, on his notion of rationality and subjectivity, and on the possible ways that *Phenomenology* could affect later philosophers who give central roles to the concept of emotion or the mood in their existential or phenomenological investigations of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Having arrived at the conceptions of rational fear, rational sorrow and passionate reason, this inquiry of the Hegelian notion of emotion and its role in *Phenomenology* supports the critical view that emotions are more than purely irrational, private, ephemeral occurrences and advocates the idea that rational structures, goals, actions, intra-subjective and intersubjective relations do not necessarily exclude irrationality. The result of this investigation challenges the reductive and antinomic judgments on rationality and irrationality by questioning the

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clear-cut boundary drawn between them. It ultimately points at the possibility of different conceptions of rationality helping us to form a more holistic view of ourselves and our practices in their relatedness by rejecting the internal dividedness of the self.

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